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THE BASIS AND LIMITS OF THE PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE'S CREDIBLE
UTILITY STANDARD
'David G. Perryman* and Nagendra Setty**
INTRODUCTION
"Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor
disputable, that one may patent only that which is 'useful.' "1
Justice Fortas' oft quoted admonishment from Brenner v. Manson
identifies one of the three statutory requirements2 for obtaining
patent protection, but provides little else as guidance for the patent
practitioner faced with the sufficiency of alleged utility in a
particular case. The Brenner Court further characterized the
amorphous utility requirement in the following admission: "[a]s is
so often the case, however, a simple everyday word can be pregnant
with ambiguity when applied to the facts of life."3
Fully cognizant of the "pregnant" ambiguity that practitioners
and the Patent and Trademark Office alike face in dealing with
utility in the context of chemical patent applications, the Court
conspicuously failed to render true or insightful direction.4 All
that is plain from the decision is that an invention must have a
"practical utility" to satisfy the statute.5 Only in the wake of the
Court's failing has the Patent and Trademark Office interpreted the
Brenner language and the underlying statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101.
* David G. Perryman is a partner in the Atlanta, Georgia intellectual property firm of
Needle & Rosenberg, P.C., and currently is serving as Co-Chair of the Utility Subcommittee
of the Biotechnology Committee of the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA).
** Nagendra Setty is an associate with the Atlanta, Georgia intellectual property firm
of Needle & Rosenberg, P.C.
'Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). The Court's
opinion was based upon the statutory language contained in 35 U.S.C. § 101 1964. See infra
note 6.
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 & 103 (1988).
'Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529.
' The Court's failing is reflected by the numerous scholarly works criticizing Brenner. See
DONALD C. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 4.02[2], at 4-11 n.18 (1994).
'Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529.
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Examiners,' the Board,7 and the courts have varied drastically
in their interpretations of Brenner and what a "practical utility" is,
or should be. The Patent and Trademark Office has been highly
criticized for applying an overly harsh utility standard.' In
response to this criticism, new Patent and Trademark Office
guidelines on utility have been adopted to give Examiners guidance
on this issue.9
This paper addresses the problems associated with the applica-
tion of an overly harsh utility requirement. The authors also
analyze the inconsistencies in the case law concerning the proper
standards and evidentiary proofs for satisfying the utility require-
ment in a patent application. A comparison of the various case law
standards to the new Utility Guidelines, and a discussion of their
practical effects, follows. Finally, the limits of the application of
the new "credible" evidence standard are addressed.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
In the past decade, the United States government, universities,
and numerous other research foundations (collectively referred to
as "non-profit institutions") have taken a decided turn toward
promoting the transfer of technology from the public sector to the
private sector and have used an aggressive patent strategy to
achieve that goal.10 The reasoning of those institutions - that
patents are essential to the facile transfer of technology - is
buttressed by the fact that unpatented technology often does not
provide sufficient market exclusivity to justify the expense that the
private sector would incur in developing and marketing an
invention. Thus, the public derives little benefit from such
unprotected technology.
6 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Examiners ("Examiners").
'The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("Board").
8 Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions: Public Hearing Before the United States
Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office, San Diego, California, October 17,
1994.
0 The Patent and Trademark Office Examiner Guidelines for Examination of Applications
for Compliance with the Utility Requirement (hereinafter "Utility Guidelines"), 60 Fed. Reg.
97, 98 (1995).
" See generally Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 2:509510
2
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/3
CREDIBLE UTILITY STANDARD
A. NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS
The primary axiom held by researchers at universities, govern-
ment agencies and other non-profit organizations has been "publish
or perish." Because this concept has been endemic in academia for
many years, landmark scientific findings and incremental forward
steps alike have led to immense growth in the scientific literature.
Non-profit institutions take great pride in the scientific literature
generated by their researchers, and the notoriety linked to such
publications contributes to the severe pressure on basic scientists
to publish results or risk advancement along a path of academic
success.
As a result of this pressure, it has become increasingly important
for the institutions' technology transfer offices" to instill in
researchers an understanding of the severe price paid for prema-
ture notoriety. Foreign patent rights are substantially destroyed
by public disclosure of research findings, because most foreign
countries require patent applications to be filed before any public
disclosure of the invention. As such, technology transfer offices
now teach the virtues of the "patent, then publish" approach. The
result of these teachings has been that non-profit institutions file
patent applications as early as possible in the course of research,
thereby allowing post-filing disclosure of preliminary results at
conferences, seminars and the like.
Publication of preliminary results is particularly important to
non-profit institutions that seek to license their discoveries. By
licensing biotechnologies 2 to the private sector, further testing
and marketing of biotechnology resulting from non-profit research
is made possible. 3 Private sector licensees undertake those
developmental functions and, through their royalty payments,
" A technology transfer office is responsible for encouraging faculty researchers to file
patent applications on their basic science invention and managing the transfer of the
invention to private industry.
12 This paper uses biotechnology to mean any process which occurs in a cell or any
molecule derived from a cell. However, since the utility principles overlap, traditional small
molecule pharmaceuticals will be included in biotechnology.
" Many charters of non-profit organizations do not allow, and they often do not have the
desire or facilities to undertake, the further testing and marketing of biotechnology resulting
from non-profit research.
1995] 511
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provide much needed capital that cycles back to further commer-
cially viable basic research. Since the inventors, and the laboratory
or department from which a particular invention emanates, often
take a large share of license proceeds, a proper incentive is created
for the inventor to disclose commercially viable inventions to
his/her technology transfer office. To the authors, this system
fosters goals that are in line with society's interests.
B. SMALL BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
Small or start-up biotechnology companies also need to patent
early, but for different reasons. Few investors, whether venture
capitalists, individual investors or large companies, will invest in
a small biotechnology company with neither patents nor patent
applications having a short and predictable course to issuance.
Attracting such investments requires full disclosure, and the risk
of such disclosure prior to filing patent applications is prohibitively
high. Because small companies have usually "bet the farm" on a
few products, they have a strong desire to file patent applications
early in the inventive process.
The standard model for a "start-up" is to identify innovation at
a non-profit institution and base the company upon the patent
applications claiming the innovation. The patent portfolio then
becomes a major tool for raising the capital upon which the
biotechnology company would be formed. Such a model has been
the cornerstone of the competitiveness that has allowed the United
States to distinguish itself from other countries. Without the
availability of patent protection for early and innovative discover-
ies, the model for start-up biotechnology companies disappears and
carries with it our global competitiveness.
Another important consideration for all entities, regardless of
size, is the cost of patent protection. If patent applicants are
required to provide data that is convincing to a person skilled in
the art, which from the Examiner's viewpoint was most often
clinical data, then the applicant is in the unenviable position of not
being able to forecast its patent potential until lengthy, expensive
clinical trials are completed. The private sector would then not be
motivated either to form a company around, or perhaps even invest
in, technology lacking clinical data. As a result, non-profits would
512 [Vol. 2:509
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CREDIBLE UTILITY STANDARD
not be motivated to file patent applications on a discovery prior to
obtaining clinical data, and patent rights could be lost through
publication. Thus, the purpose of the Federal Technology Transfer
Act of 1986 would be defeated.
As to small and large companies, the result of requiring clinical
data to prove utility is the tremendous cost of extended prosecution
and the loss of investment. This reduces the amount of capital
available to those companies to spend on the research and develop-
ment of further improved therapeutics which would be beneficial
both to society as a whole and the United States' global competi-
tiveness. Without a clear course to patent protection, even large
companies will not pursue moderately promising compounds that,
with further development, could turn out to be of therapeutic
importance.
II. STANDARDS OF PROOF
The precise standard of proof required to satisfy the utility
requirement is unclear from the case law. The CCPA 4 seems to
apply a standard that requires an applicant claiming a compound,
or method of using a compound, to demonstrate efficacy that is
"convincing to one skilled in the art." While at odds with the
original CCPA "convincing" standard, the utility standard has
evolved, in the hands of the CAFC 15 , into what the authors believe
is a better standard: that evidence of utility must show "a
reasonable correlation" with the utility stated in an application. A
review of case law relevant to the authors' conclusion follows.'
A. THE CCPA STANDARD OF PROOF
In In re Buting,7 the applicant disclosed methods of treating a
malignant condition in humans using certain sulfones. Confirma-
tion of the activity in human subjects was alleged. 8 Evidence of
14 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).
1' Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).
i For a more general recent review of the cases relating to utility, see PTO's Examiner
Guidelines for Biotech Applications, 49 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 234 (1995).
17 418 F.2d 540, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
18Id. at 542.
1995] 513
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efficacy against a variety of tumors in mice was provided, as well
as results from two humans - one with Hodgkin's disease and the
other with myelogenous leukemia - both of whom improved in
condition.19 The CCPA held that the evidence presented by the
applicant, which was "limited to one compound and two types of
cancer," was not commensurate with the scope of utility asserted
and claimed, and suggested the applicant should either limit his
claims or submit evidence refuting the limitation.2' The Buting
court applied the "convincing" standard, relying on In re Irons for
support.21 In In re Irons,22 the CCPA first articulated the re-
quirement that an "[applicant's] proofs of [alleged] utility should be
convincing to one skilled in the art."' The amount of evidence
required depends on the facts of each individual case, 24 and the
character of evidence needed may vary depending on whether the
alleged utility appears to accord with or to contravene established
scientific principles and beliefs.25
In Irons, the applicant claimed certain new anti-guanidine
polypeptide factors and methods of using them in the treatment of
arthritis.26 In response to the Examiner's rejection of his five
clinical case histories under § 101, Irons submitted letters from
rheumatoid arthritis specialists who administered the claimed
compounds to their patients and achieved a high degree of success
in eradicating arthritic pain. The Examiner maintained his
rejection because the specialists had not conducted their trials
according to "double-blind" techniques set forth by Johns Hopkins
Hospital, and required evidence from controlled studies. 27  The
Board affirmed this result, and the matter was appealed to the
CCPA.
Speaking for the CCPA, Judge Almond reasoned that "proofs of
utility should be convincing to one skilled in the art,"' but that
Id. at 543.
20 Id. at 544.
21 Id. at 543.
22 340 F.2d 974, 978, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 351 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
2
3 Id.
?' In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 977-78, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 92 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
2In re Chilkowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
2In re Irons, 340 F.2d at 975.
27 Id. at 976-77.
2Id. at 978 (emphasis added).
514 [Vol. 2:509
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the Court could not agree with the degree of proof required by the
Examiner and the Board.29 Even though the CCPA reversed the
Board's decision as to the sufficiency of evidence of utility in Irons'
application, cases for nearly fifteen years followed the rule that
evidence of utility had to be "convincing to one skilled in the
art."
30
The CCPA ruled in In re Langer3 l that the utility asserted in a
patent application and supported with evidence from the applica-
tion must be commensurate with the scope of a claim for the claim
to issue. Langer concerned stannous chelates that were to be
incorporated into dentifrices,32 which would allegedly facilitate the
binding of stannous or bivalent tin (Sn2 ) to tooth enamel to form
an insoluble stannous phosphate layer.33 The claimed compounds
were thus alleged to aid in the prevention of tooth decay.
The claims were supported with human and animal in vivo data,
but were rejected by the Examiner because the cited literature
taught that the claimed compounds would not work either in the
manner alleged in the Langer application or with the alleged
beneficial result of creating an insoluble layer.34  Because of the
conflict between the asserted utility and the art of record, the
Examiner required that the applicant demonstrate utility with
"clear and convincing evidence commensurate in scope with the
allegation and claims."35
After a series of Examiner rejections and responses supported by
29 Id. at 977-78.
' Id. at 978. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (applying "convincing"
standard, but recognizing its limited value in determining how much evidence is "convinc-
ing"); In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 885 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (applying
.convincing" standard).
31 503 F.2d 1380, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
a "[Mlouth washes, tooth pastes, tooth powders and chewing gums .... " Id. at 1381.
33 Id. at 1381-83.
' Although there was human data, it was perfunctory, consisting of human subjects being
fitted with dental bridges bearing small slabs of human teeth and being asked to chew gum
containing varying concentrations of stannous acetate for fifteen minutes, three times a day
for one week. Analysis of the slabs for stannous tin concentration showed that there had
been some uptake. Id. at 1385. The human data did not, however, demonstrate that the
claimed compounds and methods helped retard tooth decay. That is the disputed link the
Examiner argues is lacking in the application and contrary to the teachings of the cited
references. The human data was thus not commensurate with the scope of the claims. Id.
at 1389.
"In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1388.
1995] 515
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affidavits, the applicant appealed the final rejection, and the Board
affirmed. The Board found that the cited references "provided an
adequate basis for 'skepticism' " as to the asserted utility and ruled
that the applicant "had the burden of supplying 'evidence as to
clinical testing which would resolve the issue in a simple man-
ner.' "36 The Board stated that it "cannot consider in vitro tests
alone to evidence actual utility" because of the great disparity
between endogenous species of bacteria and other microorganisms
present in rats and humans.37
The CCPA found that the Examiner had constructed from the
references a prima facie case of lack of utility, but stopped short of
ratifying the Board's ruling that only clinical data would rebut the
prima facie case. 38 The court held that "[fiull scale clinical trials
in humans ... may be necessary to establish 'commercial useful-
ness'... [but are] not required to establish 'usefulness' within the
meaning of § 101."3' The CCPA ruled that the applicant's evi-
dence of utility was sufficient to rebut the Examiner's prima facie
case of lack of utility and "to prove utility to one skilled in the
art."40 Thus, the standard that the CCPA applied may have been
a new standard other than the "convincing" standard, the bound-
aries of which were undefined.
In In re Jolles,4' the applicant disclosed compositions and
methods of their use in the treatment of acute myeloblastic
leukemia in humans. The Examiner rejected these claims for lack
of proof of utility, and the Board affirmed.42 During prosecution,
the applicant submitted two declarations indicating positive results
from one of the claimed compounds in treating humans. Another
two declarations were submitted demonstrating seven of the
claimed compounds were effective in treating cancers in mice. The
Examiner alleged that the applicant was asserting "incredible
utility" and that the human trials with the one compound could not
36 Id. at 1390.
37 Id. at 1391.
3 Id. at 1392.
nId. at 1392 (citing In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594 (CCPA 1969)).
40 In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1388.
4' 628 F.2d 1322, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 885 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
42 Id. at 1325-26.
516 [Vol. 2:509
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be used to support utility for any of the other compounds. 3
Further, the Examiner stated that she was not convinced that the
evidence submitted as to the one compound used in the human
trials was persuasive. The Board sustained the rejections to all of
the compounds except the one used in the human trials. However,
the Board ignored the animal data because it reasoned the
applicant restricted itself to human utility and not utility in
mice."'
Citing In re Buting as support for the proposition that animal
data was customarily used as a basis for the efficacy of anti-cancer
agents in humans, the CCPA reversed the Board decision and
allowed the applicant's broad class of compositions and methods of
applying them to humans."5 The court reasoned that an applicant
alleging utility of a compound with efficacy in humans must
present proof "convincing to one of ordinary skill in the art" 6 and
found that the applicant's animal data would have convinced such
a hypothetical person.
B. THE CAFC STANDARD OF PROOF
In Cross v. Iizuka,"7 the Federal Circuit finally tackled, in the
context of an interference proceeding, the difficult issue of what
data is sufficient proof to support the utility of new compositions.
Iizuka claimed certain novel and nonobvious imidazole derivatives
alleged to be useful in inhibiting thromboxane synthetase, an
enzyme associated with a cascade of compounds involved in platelet
aggregation." Relying on In re Bundy"9 and Nelson v. Bowler,5"
the Board held that Iizuka's data disclosed the pharmacological
activity of the compounds, and that the practical utility require-
4Id. at 1325.
"Id. at 1325-26. The mouse data at issue consisted of the results of seven specific,
claimed compositions in experimental tests for sub-acute toxicity, activity against sarcoma
180 tumors, and activity against leukemia L 1210. The Board found that the mouse data
was 'not relevant to establish the claimed human utility." Id. at 1327.
45 In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327-28.
4Id. at 1326.
47 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4Id. at 1042.
49 642 F.2d 430, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
50 626 F.2d 853, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
1995] 517
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ment was satisfied by the inhibitory action demonstrated in
vitro.
51
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision in finding that
the practical utility requirement was satisfied by Iizuka's in vitro
data because there was no controverting evidence.52 The court
stated that:
Presumably this is the accepted practice in the
pharmaceutical industry inasmuch as Cross has not
proffered any evidence refuting... [the evidence of
record], and we note that this practice has an inher-
ent logical persuasiveness. In vitro testing, in
general, is relatively less complex, less time consum-
ing, and less expensive than in vivo testing. More-
over, in vitro results with respect to the particular
pharmacological activity are generally predictive of
in vivo test results, i.e., there is reasonable correla-
tion therebetween.53
... We, however, find ourselves in agreement with
the Board that, based upon the relevant evidence as
a whole, there is a reasonable correlation between
the disclosed in vitro utility and an in vivo activity,
and therefore a rigorous correlation is not necessary
where the disclosure of the pharmacological activity
is reasonable based upon the probative evidence.5
... We perceive no insurmountable difficulty,
under appropriate circumstances, in finding that the
first link in the screening chain, in vitro testing, may
61 Cross, 753 F.2d at 1043.
2Id. at 1050.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
518 [Vol. 2:509
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establish a practical utility for the compound in
question. Successful in vitro testing will marshal
resources and direct the expenditures of effort to
further in vivo testing of the most potent compounds,
thereby providing an immediate benefit to the public,
analogous to the benefit provided by the showing of
an in vivo utility.55
In In re Brana,' the Federal Circuit reversed a Board decision
finding insufficient utility for the claimed dione compounds based
on in vitro data and a correlation with existing in vivo data. The
original application disclosed in vitro activity of the diones against
unspecified human tumor cells and referenced a computer analysis
of the anti-tumor activity of structurally related compounds in
leukemia in vivo murine assays used by the National Cancer
Institute. Based on the in vitro data and comparison to structural-
ly similar compounds with proven in vivo efficacy, Brana et al.
argued that their claimed diones had sufficient utility.
Despite the in vitro data and in vivo correlation, the Board
affirmed the Examiner's rejection because the applicants allegedly
failed to prove that the claimed compounds are useful.57 The
Board argued that based on several cited references, "the tests
offered by applicants to prove utility were inadequate to convince
one of ordinary skill in the art that the claimed compounds are
useful antitumor agents.""
In considering the Board's position, the court employed an
apparent two-part test to determine if an invention satisfies § 101.
First, the PTO must provide evidence "showing that one of ordinary
skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility."59
Second, if the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary
skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility, the
burden shifts "to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence
sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted
Id. at 1051.
' 51 F.3d 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
'57 d. at 1565, 1566.
" Id. at 1566 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 1566 (emphasis added).
1995] 519
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utility." °
The court held that the PTO had not met its initial burden
because neither the references cited by the PTO nor "the nature of
applicant's invention alone would cause one of skill in the art to
reasonably doubt the asserted usefulness."6' The court went on to
hold that "even if one skilled in the art would have reasonably
questioned the asserted utility ... applicants proffered sufficient
evidence to convince one of skill in the art of the asserted utili-
ty."6 2
C. THE BOARD'S STANDARD
The claimed invention in Ex parte Aggarwal' was a method of
using recombinant lymphotoxin glycoproteins to treat tumors in
animals including humans." The Examiner found the claims
broad enough to cover homogenous lymphotoxins,6' which were
supported by animal data, and heterogenous lymphotoxins,6
which were not supported by such data. The Examiner rejected the
claims under § 101 and the Board affirmed.
The Board held that the animal data did not provide sufficient
evidentiary support under § 101 "with regard to human lympho-
toxin itself."
67
The court found that:
[t]here is no question that the appellants have made
an important discovery with regard to chemical
compounds (proteins) which are the subject of serious
scientific investigation but of unverified and specula-
tive utility. Appellants urge that in such situations
it is in the public's interest that patent applications
60 ld. at 1566 (emphasis added).
6' In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (emphasis added).
62Id. at 1566, 1567 (emphasis added).
63 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992).
Id. at 1335.
T Lymphotoxins used in and obtained from the same species (e.g. obtained from a mouse
and used in a mouse).
6 6 Lymphotoxins used in and obtained from different species (e.g., obtained from a human
but used in a mouse or vice versa).6 7 Id. at 1339 (emphasis in original).
520 [Vol. 2:509
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be filed early rather than waiting for what might be
a long period of experimentation.s
Despite this seemingly persuasive argument, the Board followed
its interpretation of Brenner v. Manson and required human or in
vivo data predictive of human efficacy."9 Due to the lack of
scientific data supporting the utility of administering human
lymphotoxins, the applicant was precluded from protecting the
novel and nonobvious discovery.
In Ex parte Balzarini,7 ° the applicant claimed a novel unit
dosage of a composition and methods of its use in the treatment of
AIDS and AIDS-related diseases.71 The claims were supported
with in vitro data demonstrating the anti-viral activity of the two
active ingredients of the composition, the cytopathogenic effect on
HIV in human T-lymphocytes, and the inhibitory effects of the
active ingredients on HIV in infected human cells.72 It was
"apparent" from the specification that the primary utility alleged
was in the treatment of HIV-positive humans.73 The Board stated
that:
[i]t is the inclusion of such human efficacy in the
treatment of these diseases that forms the basis of
the examiner's questioning of the utility and enable-
ment of the claimed invention.74
681d.
6
9 Id. at 1339.
70 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991). A distinction between method
and composition claims is reflected by the following language from the Board:
[t]he appealed claims are drawn to compounds and not to a method of
treatment. Generally speaking, utility in treating a single disease is
adequate basis for the patentability of a pharmaceutical compound under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Exparte Krepelka, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 746,747 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1986). See generally
Exparte Chwang, 231 U.S.P.Q. 751, 752 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1986) (holding method cases
not applicable to compound cases); In re Irons, 340 F.2d 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (suggesting
method of use is separate factor from compound itself).71 Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1894.
7Id.
73 id.
74 Id.
1995]
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Although the application alleged utility commensurate in scope
with the claims, the Examiner disputed such allegations based on
references stating that successful in vitro testing was not associated
with the in vivo treatment of AIDS. 76 Citing Langer, the Board
ruled that "while we are not requiring human clinical trials, it may
very well be that in 1987 or even now those skilled in this art
would not accept anything short of such human clinical trials."76
From both Aggarwal and Balzarini it is apparent that recent
Board cases are not applying the reasonable correlation standard
set forth in Cross. Rather, the Board appears to be applying the
"convincing" standard promulgated by the CCPA. Despite the
Cross court's recognition of the true value and role of in vitro
testing in the real world of biotechnology research, the Board
required convincing clinical data to support claims that cover
human uses. If the Board had applied a "reasonable correlation"
standard in Aggarwal and Balzarini, both cases would likely have
been decided differently.
III. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE CROSS STANDARD
The U.S. Constitution requires only that the patent laws foster
the "useful arts," and the Federal Circuit's insight in Cross seems
to be wholly consistent with that goal. In vitro testing actually
plays the role in the biotechnology industry to which the Cross
court alluded: it represents the first tier of testing, in vivo animal
testing being the second tier and clinical testing the third. Thus,
requiring only a reasonable correlation between in vitro testing and
in vivo efficacy fosters the "useful arts."
The Federal Circuit's two-tier test set forth in Brana is of
potential concern to the public. The concern relates to the level of
evidence required by the PTO to "reasonably doubt" an asserted
utility. To be consistent with Cross, any evidence applicants
present which "reasonably correlates" with the asserted utility
could not reasonably be doubted. It is only when the evidence of
record does not "reasonably correlate" with the asserted utility that
applicant must show "convincing evidence" of the asserted utility.
75 Id. at 1895.7 Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (emphasis added).
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Under this interpretation of Brana, it would be the rare case
where applicants would be required to show data convincing to the
skilled artisan. If, however, Brana allows the PTO to routinely
assert "reasonable doubt," then the case does not go far enough in
easing the utility standard because "convincing" evidence will be
routinely required of applicants. Thus, the lower standard of Cross,
which does not require that an applicant show "convincing
evidence," represents the better standard.
The benefits of applying the lower standard of Cross clearly
outweigh any detriments to the public. The rigorous evidence
needed to satisfy the "convincing" utility standard results in the
misallocation of resources within non-profit organizations. Clinical
data is not the goal of non-profits and is often prohibitively
expensive for government agencies and small biotechnology
companies. The negative incentives promulgated by the "convinc-
ing" utility standard result in a failure to file patent applications
or to pursue patent applications that would be rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Without such patent applications, the private sector
will not invest in the technology, and the public does not benefit
from the ultimate product or its use. Thus, any research discover-
ies will enter the public domain without effect.
The rigorous "convincing" standard also misallocates resources
within biotech companies. Maintaining patent applications during
the process of gathering convincing clinical data requires large
expenditures which drain resources that could otherwise be
invested in research. The loss of resources for research results in
lost benefits to the public. The harsh utility standard also falsely
redirects large pharmaceutical companies' resources only to the top
tier pharmaceutical candidates.
Small or start-up companies are further harmed because the
"convincing" standard results in the inability to raise capital since
investors often insist on issued patents or applications with a
reasonable time-line to issuance. This puts young companies in a
"catch 22" because they need capital to obtain clinical data, but
cannot obtain capital without clinical data; the very existence of
young companies is placed at risk. Thus, the "convincing utility"
standard endangers the continuing development of the U.S.
biotechnology industry and its present global competitive advan-
tage.
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The public faces minimal risk of harm by an issued patent on a
composition or method which ultimately does not work in humans
as alleged. 7 The Patent and Trademark Office appears to act for
society by preventing the creation of monopolies of knowledge.
However, if the in vitro or animal in vivo testing in a particular
case proves not to predict efficacy in humans, society has lost little
value. If claimed novel compositions or novel uses of known
compositions do not work effectively and safely in humans, they
will never pass Food & Drug Administration muster.
The potential detriment to society of a therapeutic patent on a
compound based soley on in vitro data is that, if the composition
does not prove useful in vivo, then others would be precluded from
using the compound for the life of the patent. However, if the
compound is not useful as described by the patent, it is unlikely
that it will be found to have unrelated important activities.
Furthermore, in the rare circumstance where the compound is not
useful as alleged in the patent, but is later found to have some
other use, the compound is not actually out of the public domain
because the patent is invalid for lack of utility and can be proven
such by the discoverer of the later use. In addition, the same
patent which discloses the compound for which the utility is not
ultimately supported, may, as the patent system intends, be
responsible for leading to the later discovered true utility. Finally,
since the patent system already allows for protection of a compound
based on alternative and commercially unimportant utilities, little
additional harm can occur by the issuance of a composition claim
based only on in vitro data.
Because the utility requirement would only be lowered to require
a "reasonable correlation" between in vitro evidence of in vivo
efficacy, cases of poor in vitro evidence would still not satisfy 35
In balancing the standard of utility cases, Professor Wegner states:
One must ponder what harm it does if the PTO grants a claim to a
compound that, in the end, does prove[s] [sic] to have only minimal
clinical worth? Since the patent right is entirely exclusionary in nature,
the patentee in this situation gains nothing from his grant. For every
new area of technology that emerges in the pharmaceutical arts, the
areas that the university professor or small business typically works in,
these are areas that can least afford patent-focused clinical testing, yet
these are the areas that are routinely attacked at the PTO.
Wegner, Patent Law, § 435 at 365.
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U.S.C. § 101. Thus, the likelihood of the in vitro data ultimately
not correlating with in vivo efficacy in an issued patent would be
reduced.
IV. RECENT PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE GUIDELINES
A. BACKGROUND
Over the last five years, the Patent and Trademark Office has
caused many of the problems discussed above by applying an overly
harsh utility standard. While the Patent Office examining corps
has been inconsistent, it generally has required evidence which
would be convincing to one skilled in the art." To convince
individual Examiners of utility often required human clinical data,
where human therapy was either claimed or asserted as a utility
for claimed compositions.
In response to a hailstorm of criticism, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office recently issued proposed Guidelines for Examining
Applications for Compliance with the Utility Requirement.7 9 The
new guidelines adopt a much more reasonable approach to the
utility requirement, which is in line with the goals of the patent
system.
Rather than waiting for legislative action or appeals to the
CAFC, the Commissioner held public hearings and determined that
many of the problems discussed above had in fact occurred.8° The
Commissioner's solution was to set forth a utility standard taking
a rational approach to the utility issue. While the standard
selected by the Commissioner could be challenged based on the
CCPA precedent discussed above, the new Patent and Trademark
Office standard is the proper legal standard.
78 Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1894.
' The proposed Guidelines, while subject to public comment, were slated to take effect
upon their proposal in December 1994. Bioworld Today, December 23, 1994. The effort was
spearheaded by Jeff Kushan, Attorney Advisor; Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
Box 4, Washington, D.C. 20231.
o Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions: Public Hearing Before the United States
Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office, San Diego, California, October 17,
1994.
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B. THE STANDARD
The standard of proof promulgated by the Utility Guidelines
depends on whether the patent applicant "has disclosed or asserted
any credible utility for the claimed invention."81 A rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 should not be made if an asserted utility would be
considered "credible" by one of ordinary skill in the art in view of
all the evidence of record.
82
The Utility Guidelines give meaning to the "credible" standard by
stating that "to assess credibility, the Examiner should determine
if one of ordinary skill in the art would consider the assertions of
the applicant to have any reasonable scientific basis."13 This
statement is consistent with the common dictionary meaning of
credible: "entitled to belief or trust."84
While the credible standard appears to be clear on its face, a
more detailed reading of the Utility Guidelines raises ambiguity.
The Utility Guidelines state that an Examiner's prima facie
showing of no utility must contain:
[s]upport for conclusions of the Examiner that
evidence provided by the applicant to support an
asserted utility would not be considered persuasive to
a person of ordinary skill in the art."
The requirement of "persuasive" evidence appears to be inconsis-
tent with applicants merely having to show "credible" evidence.
This occurrence in the Guidelines of "persuasive" should be changed
to "credible" for clarity and consistency with the new standard.
A related issue is the sufficiency of evidence an applicant must
present to establish a credible utility. The Utility Guidelines state
that:
"1 Request for Comments on Proposed Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Regs. 97
(Dept. Comm. 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines] at Supplementary Information § I. B.
2.
8 Proposed Guidelines at Supplementary Information § I. B. 4.
8 Proposed Guidelines at Overview of Legal Precedent Governing the Utility Require-
ment § II. B. 2. (emphasis in original).
" WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 428 (2d ed. 1967).
85 Proposed Guidelines at Supplementary Information § I. B. 3. (aXiii) (emphasis added).
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Examiners are reminded that they must treat as
true credible statements made by an applicant or a
declarant in the specification or in a declaration
provided under 37 C.F.R. 1.132, unless they can
show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
a rational basis to doubt the truth of such state-
ments.8
Here again, the Utility Guidelines seem to contradict the require-
ment that applicants must show merely credible evidence, rather
than evidence which is more likely than not true. This occurrence
of "truth" should be changed to "credibility" for clarity and consis-
tency with the new standard. 7
If these inconsistencies are nonetheless adopted in the Utility
Guidelines, Examiners should not view these two apparently
inconsistent provisions as an excuse to continue with excessively
harsh prior standards. To eliminate this possibility, the Utility
Guidelines should be modified accordingly.
As noted above, Cross v. Iizuka adopted a standard that only a
reasonable correlation between in vitro utility and in vivo activity
need be shown, and that a rigorous correlation is not necessary
where the disclosure of the pharmacological activity is reasonable
based upon probative evidence.' As also noted above, the Utility
Guidelines adopt a credible standard for utility. However, the
Utility Guidelines also address the reasonable correlation and
reasonably predictive standard they contain as a special consider-
ation for asserted therapeutic or pharmacological utilities.8 9
s Proposed Guidelines, at Supplementary Information § I. B. 4. (emphasis added).
The apparent inconsistency in the Utility Guidelines possibly can be explained by the
application of the "persuasive" and "truth" standards to the facts on which an ultimate
determination of credibility is based. Any facts presented in applicant's showing of utility
must be persuasive to one of ordinary skill in the art such that the hypothetical person
would not have a reasonable basis to doubt their truth.
88 753 F.2d 1040, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Proposed Guidelines at Overview of Legal Precedent § III. The Utility Guidelines read:
A. A Reasonable Correlation Between Evidence and Asserted Utility is Sufficient
As a general matter, evidence of pharmacological or other biological activity of a
compound will be relevant to an asserted therapeutic use if there is a reasonable
correlation between the activity in question and the asserted utility. (emphasis in
original)
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While one can logically distinguish pharmacological utilities from
other utilities, the ultimate standard should be whether an
asserted pharmacological utility is "credible." One can assess
credibility by determining if there is either a "reasonable correla-
tion" between the evidence presented and the claimed invention or
if the evidence presented is reasonably predictive of the claimed
invention. Thus a "credible" standard encompasses both the
"reasonable correlation" and "reasonably predictive" standards.9
While it may be useful to analyze a particular pharmaceutical
utility using the reasonable correlation standard, the standard for
pharmacological utilities does not differ from the credible standard.
As noted above, public policy should dictate the utility standard.
Thus, even in view of Brana, credible evidence of utility is all that
should be required to satisfy § 101. However, at most, Brana
should be interpreted consistently with Cross and the Utility
Guidelines to require only "credible" evidence to rebut a PTO
allegation of reasonable doubt as to the asserted utility. Thus,
applicants should be required to show convincing evidence only
when rebutting the PTO's prima facie showing of a lack of credible
evidence.
The origins of the "credible utility" standard deserve some
C. Data from In Vitro and Animal Testing is Generally Sufficient to Support
Therapeutic Utility
If an applicant provides data from in vitro and animal tests to support an asserted
utility, the Examiner should determine if the tests, including the test parameters
and choice of animal, would be viewed by one skilled in the art as being reasonably
predictive of the asserted utility. (second emphasis added)
F. Treatment of Specific Disease Conditions
Thus, affidavit evidence from experts in the art indicating that there is a
reasonable expectation of success, supported by sound reasoning, usually should
be sufficient to establish that such a utility is credible. (emphasis in original)
go Determination of credibility may require a two-step process for an alleged pharmaceuti-
cal utility which is based on in vitro data of a pharmacological activity. First, the credibility
of in vivo pharmacological activity must be determined based on the in vitro pharmacological
data, i.e., does the in vitro pharmacological activity reasonably correlate with in vivo
pharmacological activity. Second, it must be determined whether it is credible that the in
vivo pharmacological activity will be effective in treating the condition associated with the
pharmacological activity; i.e., does the pharmacological activity reasonably correlate with
therapeutic activity.
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exploration. The Utility Guidelines themselves purport to be based
on case law, including the CAFC's decision in Cross v. Iizuka, but
the "credible" standard of evidence for practical utility does not
directly appear anywhere in Cross or the CCPA cases.9 As noted
above, there is a conflict between the Utility Guidelines/Cross
standards and the CCPA's requirement that there be evidence
"convincing to one skilled in the art" even when the PTO has not
set forth a prima facie case of inadequate utility. Thus, in selecting
the "credible" standard, the Patent and Trademark Office has
followed the Cross precedent, even though that precedent did not
specifically overrule CCPA precedent requiring a "convincing"
utility. Given the existence of inconsistent standards in the case
law, the Patent and Trademark Office could follow either standard.
However, since the Utility Guidelines follow the legal standard
consistent with public policy, the application of a "credible"
standard should withstand any challenge based on CCPA precedent
or the second tier test of Brana.92
1 The "credible" standard of the new Utility Guidelines appears to be crafted from whole
cloth, and is not a mere codification of the Cross pronouncements. Cross speaks only in
terms of "reasonable correlations" between the evidence of utility in an application and the
claimed therapeutic use. Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Indeed,
there is no discussion in Cross or virtually all of the earlier cases of the "credible" utility
standard.
But there is historical support for the distinction between a merely "credible" utility and
a sufficient "practical utility" under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Application of Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887,
889-90, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (C.C.P.A. 1965), the CCPA noted the Patent Office's view
that the applicant's "allegations of success in vitro, while not sufficient under section 101,
were at least credible." Although the CCPA ultimately did not rule on the purported
distinction between a credible utility and a utility sufficient to satisfy § 101, the Isaacs case
demonstrates that the Patent Office has long believed in a distinction between "credible" and
.practical" utilities.
" It is unlikely that a defendant in a patent infringement action will raise this
inconsistency. That is, one accused of infringing the invention embodied in the claims of a
patent would be hard pressed to argue that there is no utility in that invention. From the
defendant's use of similar or infringing technology, the "practical utility" of the invention
would likely be manifestly obvious at least as a matter of inference.
However, the inquiry into the discrepancy between the CCPA and CAFC/Utility Guidelines
standards is not purely academic because the issue could arise during an interference
proceeding. In an interference, the litigated issue concerns which party first "invented" the
overlapping subject matter contained in the parties' respective applications. "Invention" is
commonly defined as a conception and reduction to practice, and each party's patent
specification must adequately disclose that invention, including sufficient "practical utility,"
which is supported by Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044, (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Therefore, one fertile area for dispute in an interference proceeding is the sufficiency of the
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V. THE LIMITS OF THE UTILITY STANDARD
The new Utility Guidelines were slated to take effect immediately
in December, 1994. Since inception, the new Utility Guidelines
have been largely followed by the Examiner corps, with the effect
of a much reduced standard of proof.93 Thus, a reduced Patent
and Trademark Office utility standard appears already to have had
a positive impact consistent with the goals of the patent system.
A. REJECTIONS UNDER 35 u.s.c. § 101/112
Since the effective date of the Utility Guidelines, patent practitio-
ners have reported that some rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 have
been converted into rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112 based on the
same factors as the § 101 rejection.94 The Patent and Trademark
Office often rejects patent applications under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and
§ 112 for the same reasons.95 The basis for this § 101/112 rejec-
tion can be found in In re Jolles9 and Application of Isaacs9 7,
parties' specifications in disclosing "practical utility." That was the precise context in which
the CAFC issued its decision in Cross v. lizuka. Cross alleged that lizuka was not entitled
to the priority of his earlier Japanese patent application, which was senior to Cross'
application, because the Iizuka application allegedly failed to set forth sufficient "practical
utility." Id., at 1043. Because the CAFC found that the lizuka application stated a
.pharmacological activity," which the Court then found to be sufficient utility, it ruled that
Iizuka was entitled to its priority filing date. But the court in Cross did not evaluate the
sufficiency of the stated utility under the CCPA's "convincing" standard. For a complete
discussion of Cross, see supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. To the extent there is a
distinction between the standards for proving utility articulated in the CAFC and CCPA
cases, the distinction could be argued in the interference context.
" In some cases, multiple long-standing rejections have been withdrawn by Examiners,
including one application which was on appeal to the Patent Office Board of Appeals and
Interferences.
94 35 U.S.C. § 112, p 1:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention. Id.
9This type of rejection can be called a § 101/112 rejection.
"628 F.2d 1322, 1325, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 885 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
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which hold that an application having an inadequately disclosed
utility cannot teach someone skilled in the art how to use the
invention. Since the utility factors are applied to this type of "how
to use" rejection under § 112, the conversion of a utility rejection to
a § 112 rejection has the same negative impact on industry and
society, and the Patent and Trademark Office should discontinue
this type of rejection practice. If Examiners, however, still apply
a utility type rejection under § 112, the applicant should be able to
overcome it by showing the same evidence that establishes a
"credible" utility that satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 101. s
This § 1011112 issue was recently considered in In re Brana. In
Brana, the claims on appeal were rejected only under 35 U.S.C. §
112.1°° While the rejection was under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the court
noted that the rejection was based only on the issue of whether the
compounds had practical utility. 1 1 The court recognized that a
rejection can be maintained under both 35 U.S.C. § 112 and § 101,
stating "if a claimed invention does not have utility, the specifica-
tion cannot enable one to use it."102
9 347 F.2d 887, 888-89, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (C.C.P.A. 1965). See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
98 Naturally, one must still provide an adequate written description for one skilled in the
art to make the claimed invention. However, in pharmaceutical applications this can often
be satisfied simply by teaching how to make the compound, since determining administration
routes and optimizing dosage are typically routine.
"Overview of Legal Precedent Governing the Utility Requirement I. B. seems to be the
basis for Examiners converting § 101 rejections to § 112 rejections. It states that "if an
invention is only partially successful in achieving a useful result a rejection of the claimed
invention as a whole under § 101 is not appropriate." Footnote 9 in the Utility Guidelines
states that "in such case, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 may be appropriate.' (citing In
re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1973), and In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
The Guidelines improperly rely on these two cases. In Gardner, the CCPA expressly
stated that "as this court pointed out in Fouche, absence of the asserted utility may properly
lead to a rejection under either provision [§§ 101 or 112]." 475 F.2d at 1392. That is, the
absence of utility may support a rejection under either § 101 or § 112, but that observation
by the CCPA does not lead to the conclusion that even though utility is satisfied, § 112 may
not be. In fact, the opposite conclusion is closer to the mark of the CCPA's holding: that
satisfaction of the § 101 requirements is a fortiari a satisfaction of the "how to use"
component of § 112. Similarly, the CCPA in Marzocchi does not even mention utility or §
101. Thus, the Guidelines' reliance on Marzocchi appears to be misplaced.
'0o 51 F.3d 1560, 1564.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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The court applied a § 101 utility analysis and did not consider
any other requirements of § 112, first paragraph. The court
concluded that applicants had satisfied the utility requirements
under § 101 and reversed the Examiner's rejection under § 112,
first paragraph. Thus, Brana is entirely consistent with the
proposition that § 101 utility rejections should not be converted to
§ 112 enablement rejections when § 101 has been satisfied by an
adequate showing of practical utility.
B. RESEARCH TOOLS
The Patent and Trademark Office's recent practice often has been
to deny protection for certain research tools based on the holding
of Brenner v. Manson.10 3 In Brenner, the claims were directed to
a novel method of making a certain class of compounds. Since
there was no use for the compounds set forth in the application, the
court found that there was insufficient utility if the product of the
process is useful only as the object of scientific research.' °4 In
other words, the only use of the compounds at issue was to research
the compounds' potential uses.
The Patent and Trademark Office has argued, based largely on
dicta in Brenner, that proteins and other molecules that do not
have an activity associated with a therapeutic benefit are not useful
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although a protein can be used to study the
cellular mechanisms in which the protein displays its activity, i.e.,
as a research tool, the Patent and Trademark Office has taken the
position that the use does not constitute a presently available
utility. 105
The research tool scenario is, however, distinct from the holding
of Brenner. In the research tool scenario, the protein itself is not
the object of testing, but is, instead, useful as a valuable research
tool. Although the result of that research would be unknown at the
time of application, it benefits society in the broad sense and may
103 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
104 Id. at 535-36.
1" For example, a protein is discovered which has an effect in cell proliferation. Unless
applicant can show a nexus between the protein and preventing cancer, utility is denied. In
other words, the Patent and Trademark Office has argued that using the protein to study
cell proliferation is not sufficient utility.
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directly lead to valuable therapeutics.1" Therefore, the Patent
and Trademark Office has expanded the holding of Brenner to the
detriment of the patent system. Allowing such claims can provide
significant benefits to society, by furthering the commercial
development of these tools and allowing for cost-effective procure-
ment of patents; the downside or cost to society is minimal.
The Utility Guidelines adopt any real world value as satisfying
35 U.S.C. § 101:
Practical utility is a shorthand way of attributing
'real world' value to claimed subject matter. In other
words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed
discovery in a manner which provides some immedi-
ate benefit to the public." 7
Examiners must be careful not to interpret the
phrase "immediate benefit to the public" or similar
formulations in other cases to mean that products or
services based on the claimed invention must be
'currently available' to the public in order to satisfy
§ 101. Rather, the Examiner should accept as
sufficient any reasonable use that an applicant has
identified for the invention that can be viewed as
providing a public benefit.108
Thus, the only question in a particular application is determining
if the use is reasonable. The research tool area should satisfy the
reasonable use standard, especially when the research tool is
something for which industry will pay. Thus, a protein having a
disclosed activity, but no known or suspected therapeutic benefit
106 In fact, such research tools are valuable and are an important commercial industry.1
o7Overview of Legal Precedent Governing the Utility Requirement I. A. (citing Nelson v.
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881, 883 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
10 Id.
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satisfies real world value for utility." 9
The new Utility Guidelines also invite a return to the issue of
whether novel DNA fragments satisfy the new real world value
requirement.1 It should be readily apparent that such DNA
fragments can be used as primers and probes to locate genes and
proteins of real value. That use of such fragments certainly has
real world value. Thus, the fragments should satisfy the utility
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.111
CONCLUSION
There were distinct disadvantages to the overly stringent
"convincing" utility standard promulgated by the CCPA and
enforced by the Patent and Trademark Office. The standard was
satisfied only by applications supported by clinical data, resulting
in the lack of protection for much biotechnology and pharmaceutical
research.
The CAFC perceived the error of the "convincing" standard and,
in Cross v. Iizuka, set forth the more tenable "reasonable correla-
tion" standard. Despite the Cross guidance, the Board and
examining corps continued to apply the "convincing" standard until
" A less clear issue is whether a protein for which any activity has yet to be determined
satisfies practical utility. Awarding a patent to such a discovery is consistent with the goals
of the patent system of providing motivation to look for such proteins and provide exclusivity
such that a non-profit discovery of such a protein can be cost-effectively licensed by private
industry if the protein turns out to be commercially relevant. Although similar to Brenner
v. Manson, this situation can be distinguished from Brenner because a purified protein differs
from a small molecule in that one knows the protein has some, albeit presently unknown,
activity which will have value as a tool in studying cellular function. In addition, the holding
of Brenner v. Manson has been criticized. See DONALD C. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, §
4.02[2], at 4-11, n.18 (1994).
11 The U.S. government through the National Institutes of Health Office of Technology
Transfer filed patent applications claiming novel DNA fragments for which no gene, and thus
protein, was known. After much criticism from researchers, the National Institutes of
Health withdrew those applications.
. A less clear issue is the scope of such claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Specifically, if the
claims are to any nucleic acid comprising the novel fragment such that the gene encoding the
fragment would infringe the claim, based on present practice, the Patent and Trademark
Office will likely reject the claims based on lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph. In such a case an applicant should adequately describe how one would go about
cloning the entire gene and finding the activity of the encoded protein to increase the
likelihood of satisfying 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
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Commissioner Lehman issued new examination guidelines.
The Guidelines reiterate the role of the Cross standard and set
forth a "credible" utility standard. By redefining the contours of §
101 and the utility standards, the Guidelines address the real harm
dealt to the public by the "convincing" standard.
There is, therefore, little societal benefit achieved by converting
a § 101 rejection to a § 112 rejection. Nevertheless, the examining
corps continues to espouse the conversion practice to substitute §
112 obstacles for those no longer available under the § 101 rubric.
Only time will allow practitioners to evaluate the Guidelines'
practical impact on examination of biotechnology and pharmaceuti-
cal applications.
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